Many believe that a bubble was behind the high prices of Internet stocks in 1999-2000 , and that short-sale restrictions prevented rational investors from driving Internet stock prices to reasonable levels. 35 Using intraday options data from the peak of the Internet bubble, we find no evidence that short-sale restrictions affected Internet stock prices. Investors could also cheaply short synthetically using options. Option strategies could also permit investors to get mitigate synchronization risk. During this time, information was discovered in the options market and transmitted to the stock market, suggesting the bubble could have been burst by options trading.
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We will use the term bubble throughout this paper without concluding whether the high prices of Internet stocks at that time really represented a bubble.
Introduction
Prices of Nasdaq-listed technology stocks rose dramatically in the late 1990s, peaked in March 2000, and then lost more than two-thirds of their value over the next two years. Many of the largest price run-ups and subsequent collapses occurred in stocks associated with the Internet.
Few of these companies were profitable and most had minimal revenues. Many observers have concluded that a bubble existed for Internet stocks in 1999 -2000, and that prices of these stocks were irrationally high 1 .
If Internet stock prices were obviously irrationally high, why didn't rational investors short them and drive prices back to rational levels? point to shortsale restrictions as the reason that Internet stocks remained high. To sell short, shares in the stock have to be borrowed. Most actively traded stocks can be easily and cheaply borrowed. In some cases though, shares become expensive to borrow if they can be located at all. Even if shares are borrowed and sold short, there is always the possibility that the loan of shares will be recalled and the short position closed against the wishes of the short seller.
Others emphasize that short selling is risky. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) consider the possibility that prices may move further out of line before any mispricing is corrected. For rational investors with long time horizons and few financial constraints this risk is not a serious problem. But, hedge funds or other intermediaries may be faced with an outflow of capital if they lose much money in the short-term. Likewise, short-term losses can result in margin calls or other costs to investors even if they are making the correct long-term investment decisions. Abreau and Brunnermeier (2002 ) suggest that bubbles burst only after they are attacked by multiple short sellers. Synchronization risk arises because a short seller is uncertain how long he will have to wait until enough others arrive to burst the bubble. In the meantime he must pay carrying costs. If the short seller is a hedge fund or other intermediary it faces the possibility that investors will withhdraw money.
In this paper we use a unique dataset to examine option prices for Internet stocks around the peak of the Nasdaq bubble. We have several objectives. First we look for evidence that Internet stocks were hard to short by comparing actual stock prices with contemporaneous prices of synthetic shares created with options. claim that arbitrage opportunities from buying synthetic shares and selling the actual shares were common and that they indicate that short-sale constraints for Internet stocks were severe enough to affect stock prices. This claim is suspect however, as they use closing options quotes and last trade prices for the stock to identify put-call parity violations. Second, we compare the proceeds of short-sales with the proceeds from synthetic sales to see whether options provided a viable alternative to short-selling. Finally, we see whether rational investors' option trading could have driven down
Internet stock prices by examining whether information was discovered in the options market and transmitted to the stock market during this period. Our ultimate goal is to determine whether market imperfections could have kept Internet stock prices at inflated levels in 1999 -2000.
Our use of intraday data permits us to control for microstructure problems and data nonsynchroneity in looking for the arbitrage opportunities associated with short-sale constraints.
Hence, in sharp contrast to and Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2003) , we find few cases when synthetic and actual share prices diverge enough to appear to create arbitrage profits from short-selling. Indeed, the option and stock prices track each other so closely that we conclude short sale restrictions did not seem to have an important impact on
Internet stocks.
We also show that short sales of synthetic shares, formed by buying puts and writing calls, are a viable alternative to selling actual shares short. For Internet stocks during the sample period, the expected proceeds from a synthetic short sale averaged about 99.5% of the expected proceeds from the short sale of actual shares. Even the hard-to-borrow stocks in our sample could be easily sold short synthetically, yielding proceeds that were on average only 0.6% less than the proceeds of an actual short-sale. We conclude from this that investors had ample opportunities to profit from overpriced Internet stocks. In a similar vein, we show that options can be used to eliminate and even profit from the synchronization risk posited by Abreau and Brunnermeier (2002 ) .
Would synthetic short sales in the options market been sufficient to induce the bubble to burst? Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2003) posit a behavioral model in which rational investors trade options and irrational investors trade stock. Under these circumstances, trading in options would not bring overpriced shares back into line. We find, however, that during the bubble a significant amount of price discovery took place in the options market and was transmitted to the stock market. Using a technique pioneered by Hasbrouck (1995) , we show the minimum proportion of price discovery that occurs in the options market varies from 2.9% to more than 30% across Internet stocks. We also find evidence that a larger proportion of price discovery takes place in the options market on days when the stock price declines than on days when it rises. This is consistent with costs of selling short inducing some investors with unfavorable information to trade options rather than the stock itself.
As a whole, our findings indicate that short-sale constraints were not responsible for the high prices of Internet stocks at the peak of the bubble. Investors could have sold these stocks short. They could have insured against synchronization risk. Alternatively, they could have sold short synthetically using options, and the information would have been transmitted to the stock market. The fact that investors did not take advantage of these opportunities to profit from overpriced Internet stocks suggests that the overpricing was not as obvious then as it is now with the benefit of hindsight.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss recent work on short-sale restrictions and the Internet bubble. Section 3 provides a description of our data. In Section 4 we examine whether option prices suggest that short sale restrictions in the stock market resulted in prices for Internet stocks that were too high. We explore whether options could be used to circumvent restrictions and risks of short sales in Section 5. In Section 6 we look at the information content of option prices. A summary is provided in Section 7.
Short Sales Restriction and the Internet Bubble
Economists have speculated whether costs and restrictions of short-selling affect stock prices. Miller (1977) considers a situation where short-sale restrictions prevent pessimistic investors from selling stock. In this case, stock prices will reflect opinions of optimistic investors only and will therefore be biased upward.
It is an empirical question as to whether short-sale restrictions are important in practice.
D'Avolio (2002) obtains data on loan supply, loan fees and recalls from a large lending intermediary for the 18 months from April 2000 through September 2001. He shows that most stocks can be easily borrowed for short-selling at a cost of less than 20 basis points per year.
About 9% of stocks ("specials") have loan fees over 1% per year. Some of these stocks are particularly difficult to borrow and loan fees may reach over 25% per year.
A large proportion of lent shares come from institutions, particularly those that follow passive or indexing strategies. Hence it is not surprising that D' Avolio (2002) finds that large company stocks, and stocks with heavy institutional ownership are easiest to short. He also finds that shorting is more expensive when there is more dispersion of opinion about a stock -as proxied by turnover, dispersion of analyst forecasts or the number of authors posting messages on the Yahoo! Finance message board in a month.
Stock loans can be recalled at any time by the owner of the stock. D'Avolio's unconditional probability of a recall is about 1% for a particular day, 2% over a month, or 18% over the entire 18 month period. The median time to re-borrow the stock from another lender is nine days. Recalls do not appear to be prompted by "short squeezes." Lamont and Thaler (2003) study situations where short-sale constraints are significant:
carveouts of tech stocks. They identify a sample of companies that conduct initial public offerings in a subsidiary with the announced intention of spinning off the rest of the subsidiary to the parent company shareholders at a later date. In six cases, the aftermarket price of the subsidiary is so high that if the same value is attached to the remaining shares owned by the parent, the implied value of the rest of the parent's assets is negative. An example in their paper is 3Com's carveout of Palm. for Internet stocks than others. This implies that short selling could not be used to reduce the price of the stock to the same level as the price of a synthetic share created by buying a call, writing a put with the same exercise price, and lending money.
To examine put-call parity, collect a sample of closing bid and ask prices for 9,026 option pairs for three days in February 2000 along with closing trade prices for the underlying equities. The options were restricted to at-the-money options on nondividend paying stocks with at least 30 days to maturity. In total, 36% of the Internet stocks had put-call parity violations as compared to only 23.8% of the other stocks.
A more comprehensive comparison of the prices of stocks and options is provided by Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2003) . They compare stock prices with the prices of synthetic shares manufactured with options positions. The idea is that prices of synthetic shares may be lower if restrictions on short sales make it difficult or expensive to short the stock itself. The authors obtain a proprietary database of shorting costs from one financial institution for July 1999 through November 2001. Their options data consists of end-of-day bid and ask quotes for options on individual stocks. They match these quotes with closing trades from the stock. These stock trades can be several minutes old. It seems likely that there are significant nonsynchroneities between these data. Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2003) find that the implied stock price from options is less than the actual stock price in 63% of the cases when the stock can be easily shorted. When a stock is difficult to short, the implied stock price is less than the actual stock price 76% of the time. More importantly, in some cases there are large differences between the synthetic stock price and the actual stock price. When a stock is easy to short, 5% of the synthetic stock prices are at least 1.5% less than the actual stock price. On the other hand, when the stock is difficult to short, 5% of the synthetic stock prices are at least 5.1% less than the actual stock price. Ofek,
Richardson and Whitelaw interpret these findings as evidence that short sale constraints provide meaningful limits to arbitrage that can allow prices of identical assets to diverge.
Not all agree that short-sale constraints were an important factor in the high prices of Internet stocks. Geczy, Musto and Reed (2002) use data on equity loans by a custodian bank for November 1998 through October 1999 to examine the profitability of various strategies. They assume stocks can be shorted only on the days when the custodian bank has actually lent shares.
They use the rebate rates actually charged by the bank in their tests. They approximate the situation of a retail investor by only considering stocks that are not on special, and an institutional investor by considering all stocks that are loaned.
They find that, at least during their 1998-1999 sample period, investors could short dotcom stocks. Both portfolios composed of all dot-com stocks lent by the intermediary, and portfolios composed only of dot-coms that were not on special track indices of Internet stocks closely. The specialness of the portfolio of all dot-com stocks is 1.15% when summed over the year. This cost is dwarfed by the price swings of the Internet stocks. Lakonishok, Lee and Poteshman (2003) examine open interest and volume on CBOE options over 1990 -2001. They find that both discount brokerage and full service brokerage customers trade more calls than puts. They were surprised at the relative unimportance of long positions in put options even during 1998 -2000, when Nasdaq prices were at their peak. They conclude that their data provides little support for the view that short-sale limitations were an important contributor to the Nasdaq bubble.
Data
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Our data are similar to those used in Battalio, Hatch and Jennings (2003 For a complete discussion of specialist and market maker obligations, see the Restated ITS Plan (1997).
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While there is no uniform definition of what constitutes abnormal market conditions across exchanges, they typically include fast or volatile market conditions, periods of time when the NBB equals or exceeds the NBO for any series in the option class or in the underlying equity market, periods of time surrounding significant news stories, communications or systems outages, and periods of time when OPRA capacity is strained. 9 marketable orders for at least the quoted size associated at prices that are no worse than their quoted prices.
3 Market makers and specialists are only exempted from this obligation if there is an order ahead or if they are in the process of changing quotes when the order arrives. Locked quotes occur when bid and ask prices are equal and are almost always associated with a market maker changing quotes. Crossed quotes occur when the best bid price exceeds the best ask price.
These are not regarded as valid quotes. To insure that our stock quotes represent prices at which investors could actually trade, we omit observations with locked or crossed quotes when we look for arbitrage opportunities and when we compare the costs of synthetic shares with the costs of actual shares.
While there was no SEC-imposed firm quote rule in the equity option market during our sample period, each exchange did guarantee that retail investors could automatically execute marketable limit orders for at least 20 contracts at or within its posted quotes during 'normal' market conditions. 4 OPRA contains a quote message which indicates when the market for an option series on an exchange is fast (i.e., when quotes are indicative for all investors), but indicative quotes are not always identified in OPRA data. Conversations with market professionals suggest quotes in the equity option market are indicative for all market participants when they exceed prespecified maximum quote widths. Thus when we look at apparent arbitrage opportunities we omit options quotes designated as fast or with spread widths exceeding the maximum.
Market professionals (i.e., market makers, professional traders, etc.) did not have access to automatic execution systems during our sample period. Indeed, a market professional in search of liquidity during our sample period was forced to reveal her identity and trading interest to the market maker who then decided whether or not to provide an execution at his posted price.
When a market maker chose not to trade with the market professional at his posted price, the market maker was required to change his quote. This is not to say that options market makers would not trade with hedge funds and other institutions at quoted prices. The prohibition against automated execution by professional is instead designed to prevent them from taking advantage of stale quotes or minor pricing discrepancies across exchanges. Institutions betting that the Internet sector was overpriced do not fall into this category. Table 1 lists our sample stocks along with the number of days that they appear in the sample and the total number of trades in their options. In total, we have 14 Internet stocks and 35
others. Many of the other stocks, while not in the Internet sector, are technology stocks. They include IBM, Intel, and Microsoft. As a whole, these are not a random sample. They tend to be among the stocks with the most active options trading.
It is critical for the rest of our analysis that our sample of Internet stocks could be traded as a proxy for the Internet sector as a whole. 
Do Option Prices Indicate Short Sale Restrictions in the Stock Market
Inability to sell short in the stock market can prevent investors from arbitraging away price differences between the stock and options markets. Investors can duplicate shares of stock 5
This assumes that the dividend is too small for the call option to be exercised early.
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in the options market by simultaneously taking long and short positions in puts and calls and either borrowing or lending cash. If the synthetic shares of stock are cheaper than the actual shares, arbitrage profits can be earned, but only if the stock can be sold short. Hence apparent arbitrage opportunities that involve buying synthetic shares and selling actual shares imply that the stock cannot be easily and cheaply sold short. Lamont and Thaler (2003) , Ofek and Richardson (2003) and Ofek, Richardson and Whitelaw (2003) all point to apparent arbitrage opportunities of this type as evidence of short-sale restrictions. Table 2 shows how a position can be created using options that is guaranteed to have the same value as the stock at the time the options expire. A synthetic share can thus be created by buying a call, writing a European put, lending the present value of the exercise price, and lending the present value of the dividend. 5 Of course, the puts traded on the options exchanges are
American puts, so we estimate the value of European puts by subtracting the early exercise premium from the value of the American put. To create a synthetic buy of a share of stock, we assume we buy the call at the ask price and write the put at the bid price. Money that is lent is assumed to earn the yield that could be obtained by purchasing t-bills. Thus a synthetic ask price for the stock is given by
Similarly, a synthetic bid price for the stock is
We calculate synthetic bid and ask prices using inside bid and ask quotes at the end of each minute from 9:45 AM to 4 PM for each day of the sample period. We only use options with exercise prices within five percent of the stock price, and with 10 to 40 days to expiration to construct synthetic shares. We use short-term at the money options because these are the options that investors prefer -open interest and trading volume are highest here. Longer term options trade on all of our sample stocks and synthetic shares could be constructed from these as well.
To calculate early exercise premia, we first estimate the implied standard deviation for each stock each day using a simple average of every end of minute call option quote for that stock. We then solve the partial differential equation numerically using a finite difference approach to calculate American and European put prices at the end of each minute using the daily implied volatility. The early exercise premium is the difference between the American and
European put values.
Interest rates are calculated from daily treasury bill prices. Prices are obtained for bills with as close to 30, 60, 90, 120, 180 and 365 days to maturity as possible. Lending rates are approximated from the ask quotes while borrowing rates are approximated from the bid quotes.
The 30 day rate is used for option exercise prices with less than 30 days until expiration, and for dividends to be paid within 30 days. For longer periods, we interpolate between rates based on longer and shorter maturities than the time to expiration.
Apparent arbitrage opportunities between stock prices and prices of synthetic shares created from options could indicate that short-sale constraints in the stock market prevent arbitrage. We look for apparent arbitrage opportunities by comparing synthetic stock prices with the actual stock prices using end of minute quotes from 9:45 to 4:00 for all days of our sample period. We separately examine arbitrage violations in which investors can buy synthetic shares in the options market for less than they can sell the shares for at the bid in the stock market and arbitrage violations in which investors sell synthetic shares in the options market for more than they would pay to buy shares at the ask price in the stock market. Only the first type of arbitrage opportunity, the kind that includes selling actual shares, is implied by short-sale restrictions.
Our results are described in Table 3 . In total, using short-term at-the-money options, we have 2,490,562 sets of quotes that can be used to generate synthetic stock prices. As expected, in the great majority of cases, there are no arbitrage opportunities. Still, we find 225,090 instances when it appears that an investor could buy synthetically in the options market and sell at a higher price in the stock market. Even before discarding quotes that cannot be traded on, the proportion of apparent arbitrage opportunities that we find is much less than the proportion found by . Like us, they use option pairs to construct synthetic shares of stock. They claim that for their sample of Internet stocks in February 2000, 36.0% of option pairs produce synthetic bids that exceed the stock price or synthetic asks that are less than the stock price. We find that for Internet stocks, only 22% of our synthetic prices imply apparent arbitrages. For other stocks over the same period, 23.8% of option pairs seem to create arbitrage opportunities with the stock market for Ofek and Richardson. We find that only 14% of the synthetic prices from our non-internet companies provide apparent arbitrages. We believe that these differences can be attributed to a fundamental shortcoming of their data. Ofek and Richardson do not clearly state what they use for their stock prices. We assume that their methodology is the same as Ofek,
Richardson and Whitelaw (2003), who use closing transaction prices in the stock. The problem with using matching closing quotes from the options market with the last trade price of the underlying stock is that data non-synchroneity may be severe.
We need to be cautious before concluding that put-call parity violations are indicative of short-sale restrictions in the stock market. The inability to sell stocks short creates only one type of arbitrage opportunity, namely that investors could purchase shares synthetically and sell them at a higher price in the stock market. But we find that arbitrage opportunities based on purchasing shares in the stock market and selling them synthetically are almost as common. Table 3 shows that, when all stocks are considered, there are 225,090 apparent arbitrages that require selling the stock and 206,281 that involve purchasing the underlying stock. This suggests that the arbitrage opportunities are not a result of short-sale constraints but are instead due to invalid quotes or other microstructure related problems.
In most cases, these potential arbitrage profits appear small. As a check on the robustness of the arbitrage violations, we count the number of times the synthetic sale price exceeded the ask price of the stock by more than 1% or $1.00. Likewise, we count the number of times the synthetic purchase price was less than the stock's bid price by more than 1% or $1.00. Most apparent arbitrage opportunities are eliminated by these filters. There remain 33,254 instances when buying stock synthetically and selling it at the bid yielded profits of more than 1% and 33,433 cases where that strategy yielded profits of more than $1 per share. Similarly, there were 30,480 cases where buying shares and selling stock synthetically in the options market yielded profits in excess of 1%, and 29,962 cases where the strategy provided profits of more than $1 per share. When we use the 1% filter, the percentage of quotes that indicate possible arbitrage opportunities is less than 2.6% of all quotes.
When Internet stocks are compared with others, it can be seen that both types of stocks seem to provide arbitrage opportunities. Non-Internet stocks appear to provide more arbitrage opportunities, but there are more of them. The proportion of quotes that result in arbitrage opportunities is higher for Internet stocks however, and Chi-square tests reveal that the proportions of both types of arbitrage opportunities are significantly larger for Internet stocks.
When we restrict our attention to violations that seem to promise profits of more than 1% or $1
per share the proportion of quotes that suggest arbitrage opportunities is again significantly larger for Internet stocks.
Are short-sale restrictions responsible for the apparent arbitrage opportunities? We have seen that the apparent arbitrage opportunities were almost as likely to involve buying shares of the stock as selling it. Thus a likely alternative explanation may be incorrect or unusable stock or options quotes. Crossed quotes occur when the inside bid exceeds the inside ask, usually when prices are changing quickly and market makers cannot adjust quotes fast enough. These are not valid quotes, and investors shouldn't expect to trade at quoted prices in crossed markets.
In Table 4 , we look more closely at the role of unusable quotes in the creation of possible arbitrage opportunities. We focus on the 225,090 cases where the synthetic ask price for the stock is lower than the actual bid price as these are the arbitrage possibilities that could occur as a This percentage is almost identical to the other sample stocks.
What explains the small number of remaining apparent arbitrage opportunities? There are several possibilities. Data errors could be one. Recall that during our sample period trade and quote message traffic sometimes exceeded OPRA capacity, resulting in stale quotes.
Alternatively, many of these apparent opportunities could be explained by our failure to include commissions or by a small differences between the interest rates we use and the actual borrowing or lending rates of possible arbitrageurs. In addition, it takes time to make the trades necessary to take advantage of these seeming arbitrage opportunities, and the mispricings are likely to be fleeting. A further complication is that the best quotes for calls and puts used to construct the synthetic share are likely to trade on different exchanges. There may be complications and time delays involved in executing trades in the stock market and possibly in two separate options markets.
To summarize, our examination of possible arbitrage opportunities provides no evidence of short sale constraints for Internet stocks. First, arbitrage opportunities that involve selling synthetic shares and buying the stock are almost as common as those that involve buying synthetic shares and selling the stock. Short sale constraints only prevent arbitrage that involves selling stock. Second, the great majority of the observed arbitrage opportunities can be attributed to quotes that do not reflect prices that investors could expect to actually pay or receive. Finally, after taking out poor quotes, arbitrage opportunities are more common for other stocks than for
Internet stocks. For our sample of Internet stocks, there is no evidence that short sale constraints affected prices at the bubble's peak.
Could Investors Circumvent Short-Selling Restrictions with Options?
Are synthetic short-sales a viable alternative to selling stock short?
If investors were prevented from selling short, they could instead sell stock short synthetically with options. By using synthetic short sales investors avoid difficulties in borrowing stock, do not have to restrict their short-selling to upticks (for NYSE stocks), and do not have to worry about their stock being recalled. It is an empirical question though whether synthetic shorts provide a good substitute for actual short sales. Lamont and Thaler (2003) , for example, show that such a strategy generated far less money than an actual short sale for their sample. In this section we examine whether synthetic short sales are viable alternative to selling short directly or whether it is too expensive to be a good alternative.
For each Internet stock we calculate synthetic bid and ask prices at the end of each minute using options with 10 to 40 days to expiration and exercise prices within 5% of the stock price.
We omit all observations in which the stock prices, call prices, or put prices were locked or crossed. We then calculate average ratios of synthetic to actual bid and ask prices for each stock each day. Table 5 reports the distributions of these daily mean ratios for each Internet stock.
For every Internet stock, the mean ratio of the synthetic bid price to the actual bid price is less than one. That is, an investor would receive slightly less by selling short synthetically than by selling short directly. This is not surprising as selling short synthetically involves two transactions, writing a call and purchasing a put. We are using bid and ask prices rather than midpoints and hence implicitly incorporating the extra transaction costs involved in selling short synthetically. Thus when there are no constraints to prevent it, selling short directly would be preferred.
On the other hand, the difference between the price an investor receives by selling short directly and the price received when selling short synthetically is very small. The biggest mean differences in our sample are for CMGI and Internet Capital Group. For these stocks investors receive about 0.4% and 0.9% less from a synthetic short sale than from an actual short sale. For
Yahoo investors received only 0.2% less from a synthetic short sale. For America Online and Cisco the difference averaged only 0.1%. The next two columns provide the 25 th and 75 th percentiles of the ratios of synthetic to actual bid prices. These figures tell us how much these ratios vary across days. Synthetic and actual bid prices are usually within 1% of each other. We calculate this using all options with 10 to 40 days to expiration and with an exercise price within 5% of the stock price. If investors used the options with highest synthetic bid price, they would expect to receive more.
To summarize, while actual short sales usually provide a better price to the short seller, synthetic short sales are a reasonable alternative. Investors can expect to receive only about 0.5% less. This difference was certainly dwarfed by the returns to be made from the decline in Internet stock prices in 2000.
The last three columns of the table provide the distribution of the ratios of the synthetic to actual ask price. If stock prices are artificially high as a result of short-sale restrictions, it may be possible to buy shares more cheaply synthetically than directly. Lamont and Thaler (2003) , for example, claim that this was the case for tech-stock carve-outs. For our sample of Internet stocks it is more expensive to buy shares synthetically, but just slightly. The biggest difference is for Open Market, which on average cost 1.3% more to buy synthetically. For America Online, Cisco, Exodus Communications or Yahoo the difference was only 0.2%.
Being able to sell short synthetically may have been especially important during late
March and April 2000 when Internet stock prices were falling rapidly. Fig. 2 shows the mean ratio of synthetic to actual bid prices on a daily basis over the sample period. The solid line shows the average ratio for Internet stocks while the dashed line shows the ratio for other stocks.
The mean ratio was never less than 0.99 for any day. Thus at most over this period investors who chose to short synthetically would receive 1% less than investors who could sell the actual shares short.
A critical question is whether investors could synthetically short-sell stock that were hard to borrow. The market maker from whom we obtain OPRA data often shorts stock. When it does, a large financial institution pays it interest on the proceeds generated from shorting the stock. For shares that are easy to locate, the interest rate is twenty basis points below the federal funds rate.
For hard-to-borrow stocks, the interest rate paid on the short-sale proceeds was lower. We obtain from the options market maker a dataset containing rebate rates for all stocks it shorted during our sample period. In the great majority of the cases the stocks are easy to locate and the rebate rate is close to the federal funds rate. We define a stock as hard to borrow on a given date if the rebate rate was at least 100 basis points lower than the typical rebate rate of 20 basis points below the federal funds rate.
By this definition, only two internet stocks are hard-to-borrow at any time during our sample period. Internet Capital Group is difficult to borrow on 80 days, while Amazon is hard to borrow on seven days. Of the other sample stocks, Rambus shows up as hard-to-borrow every day, SAP on 29 days, Elan Plc. On 14 days, and Knight trading on six days. Panel B shows the ratio of synthetic bid prices to actual bid prices and synthetic ask prices to actual ask prices for all observations for stocks that were hard to borrow and all other stocks. A stock is only counted as hard-to-borrow if it is difficult to borrow on that day. Hence some of the Amazon.com observations are among the hard-to-borrow, some are among the others.
The mean ratio of synthetic bid to actual bid is 0.994 for the hard-to-borrow versus 0.998 for the others. The stocks that investors had trouble selling-short, they could have sold shortsynthetically and received almost as high a price. The mean ratio of synthetic ask to actual ask is 1.006 for the hard-to-borrow versus 1.003 for the others. Even for the hard-to-borrow stocks It was not cheaper to buy synthetically than to buy shares directly, as Lamont and Thaler (2003) find for some of their sample stocks.
To reiterate, even at the very peak of the Internet bubble, investors could sell short synthetically and receive almost as much as if they sold the shares short. Even hard-to-borrow stocks could have been easily and cheaply sold short synthetically. There was no lack of ways for rational investors to profit from overpriced Internet stocks. Abreau and Brunnermeier (2003) observe that even if a stock can be sold short, the seller still bears what they term synchronization risk. This is the risk that other rational investors may not join them in selling short for some time, and that the short-seller will have to wait to profit from his short position. In the meantime, the short-seller is forced to pay the costs of maintaining the position and, if the seller is an institution, may face withdrawal of funds by customers.
Avoiding synchronization risk with options
Investors who are worried about this possibility can use options to, in effect, insure themselves against synchronization risk. There are several ways to do this. One way is to sell the stock short, then write one short-term put while buying a longer-term put with the same strike price. If the underlying stock does crash during the life of the shorter-term option, the values of the two will converge and the investor will lose the cost of establishing the position. On the other hand, if the stock price does not change much, the short-term option will expire worthless while the longer-term option will retain most of its value. This provides a return to the short-seller who is waiting for the stock price to fall.
We replicate this strategy by selling options with 10 to 40 days to expiration at their bid price and simultaneously buying options with 70 to 110 days to expiration at their ask. Each option in a pair will have the same strike price, which is within five percent of the stock price.
We omit pairs if either has locked or crossed quotes. We simulate this strategy using options quotes at the end of each minute for all sample days. Results are reported separately for each stock in Table 6 .
Panel A reports results for Internet stocks. The first column gives the mean time to expiration for the short-term options that are written. For example, for Amazon.com it is 25.6 days. You can think of this as the time for which the short-seller is insured against the price remaining at high levels. The next column reports the price of this insurance as a percentage of the stock's bid price. Recall that the position involves writing a short-term put and buying a longterm put, so insuring against the stock price remaining high will be costly. For the Internet stocks, the net cost of setting up the position ranges from 4.5% to 8.9% of the stock price.
The next three columns report net returns (after including the cost of the options) from the combination of a short position and the insurance from options if the stock price falls 10%, stays unchanged, or rises 10% over the life of the short maturity option. To calculate the value of the long-term put when the short-term put expires, we use the Black-Scholes model and the implied standard deviation from the call with the same maturity and strike price. Without the option position, the short-seller would earn a 10% return if the stock price fell 10%, earn no return if ths stock remained unchanged, and lese 10% if the stock price rose 10%.
The important thing to note is that when the stock price remains unchanged over the life option, a significant return is earned. It ranges from 3.1% for AOL to 7.42% for IDTC. For most
Internet stocks the return is between 4% and 5%. This is more than adequate insurance for the short-seller against the stock price remaining high.
Of course insuring against synchronization risk, like all insurance, is costly. If the stock price does fall significantly, the value of the options will converge and the short-seller's profits will be diminished by losses on the options position. In Table 6 we see that the impact of the options position is ambiguous when the stock price falls 10%. In some cases, profits from the options position result in returns of more than 10%, while in some cases the returns from the option result in returns that are less than the 10% the investor would earn through a short-sale alone. If the stock dropped enough though, the investor would be guaranteed to lose on the options. The short-seller's return is negative 10% when the stock price rises by 10%. Table 6 shows that the insurance from the options position leaves short-sellers better off when the stock rises 10% in every case. But, if the stock rose enough to leave both options almost worthless the short-seller would be worse off from the options position.
Panel B of Table 6 reports returns to this strategy for other stocks. As before, if the stock price does not change the short-seller can earn a return while waiting for the stock price to fall.
With the insurance in place, short-sellers usually earn a little less when the stock falls 10% and lose a little less when the stock rises 10%.
To summarize, synchronization risk should not have prevented smart investors from betting against the bubble by going short. Options allowed these investors to insure against the stock price remaining high and hence to earn a return while waiting for the stock to crash.
Information Content of Option Trades
6
See, among others, Cao, Chen and Griffin (2003) , Chan, Chung, and Fong (2002) and Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998). 7 See also Huang (2002) 8 We use end-of-minute quotes rather than finer time increments to minimize issues of non-synchroneity.
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Could trading in the options market burst a bubble in the stock market? In the behavioral model alluded to in Ofek, Richardson an Whitelaw (2003) , rational investors trade options, while irrational investors are the marginal traders in the stock market. In this case options trading would not eliminate a bubble in the stock market. We next test whether information is transmitted from the options market to the market for the underlying stock.
In recent years, a number of studies have examined whether price discovery occurs in the options market. 6 Our work is similar to that of Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew (2003) . They use tick data from 1988 -1992 on short-term at-the-money options to calculate implied stock prices. Following Hasbrouck (1995) , they estimate a vector moving average of stock price changes and implied stock price changes using the midpoint of quotes. They then calculate upper and lower bounds on the information share of each market. They find that options account for between 17.5% and 18.3% of the information discovery. For most stocks, the proportion of information from options increases when out of the money options are used. When bid -ask spreads are wide in the options market relative to the stock market, less information is discovered in the options market.
We also use Hasbrouck's (1995) technique to determine how much price discovery takes place in the options market 7 . The idea behind it is that actual stock prices, and synthetic stock prices are cointegrated. That is, while the synthetic and actual stock prices may diverge slightly, any divergence is temporary and the two prices move together in the long run. Determining how much price discovery takes place in each market comes down to measuring the proportion of permanent price change that first shows up as a price innovation in each market. Price innovations are measured as innovations in a vector moving average.
We obtain stock bid prices at the end of each minute from 9:45 through 4:00 each day 8 .
As before, we matching synthetic stock bid prices for each sample stock using options with 10 to 40 days to expiration and exercise prices within 5% of the stock bid price. When more than one set of options is within 5% of the bid during the day, we use the series with the exercise price within 5% of the stock price most often during the day. To calculate the vector moving average (VMA), we first estimate a vector autoregression (VAR) for each stock using ten lags of the actual and synthetic stock prices. Note that the VARs are run on the price levels, not returns. We do not use overnight returns, so the first ten observations are lost for each day.
To calculate VMA coefficients from the VARs, we follow Hasbrouck (1995) and project subsequent stock price from an innovation using the VAR coefficients. Differences in the prices are then used as estimates of the VMA coefficients. A finite order VAR implies an infinite order VMA, so we use a very large number of coefficients, 9,000. We next sum the VMA coefficients for the actual price on innovations in the actual price and coefficients for the actual price on innovations in the synthetic price. The same thing is done for VMA coefficients with the synthetic price as the dependent variable. These coefficients are used to form the two by two matrix denoted by R by Hasbrouck. Because the two price series move together in the long run, the sum of coefficients on an innovation in the actual (synthetic) prices is the same for both. Thus each row of this matrix is the same. With S as the covariance matrix of errors from the VARs, the information share of market j, S j is given by This formulation assumes though that S is diagonal; that is each price innovation occurs in one market first rather than both simultaneously. We are using fairly coarse time increments of one minute, so many price innovations will appear to occur simultaneously in both markets.
Hasbrouck (1995) provides a method for getting upper and lower bounds on the amount of price discovery in each market when the covariance matrix S is not diagonal. The Cholesky factorization of the S matrix produces a lower triangular matrix F such that S = FF!. The information share of market j is then given by This technique assigns to the first asset all of the innovations that occur in the price of the first asset and all the innovations that occur simultaneously in both assets. Thus it is the upper bound of the price discovery for the first asset. The second asset is assigned only the innovations that occur first in the prices of the second asset. Thus the technique produces a lower bound for the price discovery in the second asset. By changing the order of the actual and synthetic prices series' , we get upper and lower bounds for the proportion of price discovery that occurs in each market.
Our price discovery results are presented in Table 6 . Panel A reports minimum and maximum proportions of price discovery from the options market for Internet stocks. Results in the first two columns use all days. For Real Networks (RNWK), the sum of VMA coefficients of synthetic prices on synthetic prices was negative, suggesting any innovation that occurred in the options market was reversed. In this case, and in others like it, we do not estimate a minimum contribution to price discovery. For the other Internet stocks, the minimum price discovery that took place in the options market ranged from 2.86% for AOL to 30.61% for IDTC. For the stocks where a minimum could be computed, the average is 13.2%. Maximum price discovery estimates are much higher, with 11 Internet stocks with a maximum price discovery in excess of 50%.
When compared with Chakravarty, Gulen and Mayhew (2004) our estimates of the minimum price discovery from the options market are slightly lower (their average is 17.5%) and our estimates of the maximum are much higher. Both differences can be attributed to our use of a relatively coarse one minute time period while they use quotes for each second.
It is likely that we underestimate the total proportion of price discovery that occurs in the options market. We look only at one series of synthetic stock prices each day. We use only options with 10 to 40 days to expiration with exercise prices within 5% of the stock price to generate our synthetic prices. In many cases, options with the same expiration date and more than one strike price meet our criteria. In these cases, we retain only one series of synthetic prices. It is likely that some of the price discovery takes place in other at-the-money short-term options. It is also likely that some price discovery takes place in options with longer maturities and with options that are out of the money.
If there are constraints on short-selling such that it is faster or cheaper to sell short synthetically, we might expect the options market to contribute more to price discovery when the market is falling rather than when it is rising. To examine this issue, we divide our sample period for each stock into days when the stock price rose between 9:45 and 4:00 pm and days when it fell over that period. We then calculated the minimum and maximum price discovery measure separately for days with price increases (up days) and price decreases (down days). Results are show in the last four columns of Table 6 .
When we compare the minimum proportion of price discovery from options for Internet stocks across up and down days, we see that it is usually higher for down days. There are 12
Internet stocks with minimum price discovery estimates for down days. For ten of the 12, the estimated proportion of price discovery on down days exceeds the minimum proportion for up days. On average, the minimum price discovery on down days is 16.2%. On up days it is 8.7%. It is difficult to assess the statistical significance of these findings. Nevertheless they do suggest that options on Internet stocks played a bigger role in price discovery for declining prices than for increasing prices.
Panel B of Table 6 provides the same analysis for non Internet stocks. For these stocks, like the Internet stocks, most price discovery appears to take place in the stock itself. A significant proportion does take place in the options market though. One way in which these stocks seem to differ from the Internet stocks is that the minimum price discovery from options trades does not appear to be larger on down days than up days. For the other stocks, the estimated minimum price discovery on down days is larger than on up days for 12 stocks. The estimated price discovery on down days is smaller than on up days for 17 stocks.
All of these results demonstrate that price discovery did take place in the options market during the Internet bubble. Had investors sold short synthetically, that information would have been transmitted to the stock market. It does not appear to be plausible that irrational investors could determine prices in the stock market while rational investors determined prices independently in the options market.
Summary and Conclusions
It is widely believed that a bubble existed in Nasdaq stock generally and Internet stocks in particular in 1999 -2000. Some researchers have proposed that restrictions on short-selling prevented rational investors from driving prices of Internet stocks back to reasonable levels during this time. Researchers point to apparent arbitrage opportunities that involve selling shares and buying synthetic shares as indications that short-sale constraints were binding.
We show, however, that these arbitrage opportunities are illusory. Our intraday data allows us to minimize non-synchroneity problems. This alone significantly reduces apparent arbitrage opportunities. Almost all the rest disappear when we discard locked or crossed quotes or quotes from fast options markets. In other words, the apparent arbitrage opportunities almost all arise from quotes that investors could not actually trade on. The bottom line is that we find no evidence from apparent arbitrage opportunities that short sale restrictions prevented investors from going short Internet stocks.
We also show that investors could easily short stock synthetically by purchasing puts and writing calls. Investors could expect to receive almost as much from a synthetic short sale as from an actual short. The extra amount lost to transaction costs from a synthetic short, about 0.5%, was dwarfed by the later decline in prices of Internet stocks. Even hard-to-borrow stocks could have been sold short synthetically to produce almost the same proceeds as an actual short.
Inability to sell borrow shares is not the only reason that investors may avoid shorting overpriced stock. Synchronization risk occurs short sellers are not sure how long it will take other rational investors to drive down the price of an overvalued asset. Options allow the shortseller to hedge synchronization risk by writing short-term puts and buying longer term puts. We show that this strategy could have been used during our sample period to produce large returns for short-sellers while waiting for the bubble to burst.
Our evidence indicates that synthetic short sales in the options market could have burst the Nasdaq bubble. We find that price discovery did take place in the options market during our sample period. Moreover, we find that a larger portion of price discovery took place in the options market on days when the stock price declined.
Traders could have bet against Internet stocks before the Nasdaq bubble burst. We propose that they did not because it was not obvious to them that Internet stocks were too high.
They were trying to value companies in a new industry with unprecedented levels of recent growth. We academics, along with reporters and regulators, have the unfair advantage of hindsight. Table 2 .
Creating a synthetic share of stock using options. A share of stock has the same value as a long position in a call, writing a European put, and lending the discounted value of the exercise price plus the discounted value of the dividend. At the end of each minute, synthetic purchase and sales prices for the each stock is constructed using all options with exercise prices within 5% of the stock price and having between 10 and 40 days to expiration. A buy option sell stock arbitrage occurs when it is cheaper to buy the stock synthetically with options than to sell the actual shares in the market. A sell option buy stock arbitrage occurs when an investor would pay less to buy the actual stock than could be received by selling the stock synthetically. The P 2 p-value is from a chi-square test of whether the same proportion of Internet quotes and quotes of other stocks present arbitrage opportunities.
Internet Stocks
Other End-of-minute quotes from options with 10 to 40 days to expiration and with strike prices within 5% of the stock price are used to calculate synthetic stock prices. The synthetic bid is the bid price of the call minus the ask price of the put plus the early exercise premium, plus the discounted value of the option strike prices plus the present value of any dividends. The synthetic ask is the ask price of the call minus the bid price of the put plus the early exercise premium, plus the discounted value of the option strike prices plus the present value of any dividends. Observations are discarded if the stock quotes, call quotes or put quotes are locked or crossed. Borrowing and lending rates are based on bid and ask yields of treasury bills that mature near the option's expiration The mean ratio of synthetic to actual prices is calculated at the end of each minute. For each stock, the mean ratio is of synthetic to actual bid price and synthetic to actual stock price is calculated each day. Table 7 . The proportion of price discovery that occurs in the options market. For each stock, a time series of synthetic and actual bid prices is constructed. Options with 10-40 days to expiration and with a strike price within 5% of the stock's bid price are used to generate synthetic bid prices. If more than one near term option strike price is within 5% of the stock price on a day, we use the options with the strike price that is within 5% of the stock price for the largest portion of the day. A vector moving average model is estimated using the actual and synthetic bid prices. The total proportion of the innovations that shows us up first in the synthetic bid price series is the minimum proportion of price discovery from the options market. The proportion of the innovation that shows up first in the synthetic price or shows up simultaneously in both prices is the maximum price discovery from the options market. 
